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ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGAINST PHARMACEUTICAL 
PRODUCT HOPPING: PROTECTING CONSUMERS OR REACHING 
TOO FAR? 
ABSTRACT 
Pharmaceutical drugs are the backbone of modern medicine, which makes 
the continued development of new drugs essential and puts many lives in the 
hands of the brand-name pharmaceutical companies that develop these new 
treatments. Currently, antitrust litigation is being used to strike a balance 
between the innovator’s right to earn a profit and the need for generic drug 
companies to make these drugs available to the masses that need them. 
Antitrust law stops brand-name companies from taking over the market and 
excluding generics, but it should not be used to impose harsh remedies that 
restrict the thing that we all rely upon: brand-name companies’ motivations to 
innovate. 
The federal districts are split on this issue, and although the facts differ in 
each case, the courts agree that the presence of consumer coercion is what 
differentiates permissible competitive strategies by brand-name companies 
from impermissible, anticompetitive product hopping. Intertwined with the 
issue of product hopping is how to remedy it. While fines are an appropriate 
penalty, the Second Circuit’s injunction that forced a brand-name company to 
continue manufacturing a discontinued and possibly outdated drug is 
unprecedented and threatens the very thing society must protect—brand-name 
companies’ abilities to innovate. Product-hopping litigation shows no signs of 
slowing down, and between the Second Circuit’s far-reaching injunction and 
the growing possibility of a circuit split, the time is right for the United States 
Supreme Court to take up product-hopping litigation and issue an affirmative 
ruling that allows generics to provide people the drugs they desperately need, 
while also providing brand-name pharmaceutical companies the ability and 
motivation to continue innovating. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Western medicine is powered by technology, constantly improving 
treatments, increasing quality measures, and perhaps most integral to this 
system, ubiquitous use and reliance on pharmaceuticals. Continuous 
improvement, innovation, and development of pharmaceuticals are essential to 
the health care system. To ensure that these drugs become affordable to the 
masses, there is legislation that provides incentives to stimulate innovation 
while also encouraging generic drug manufacturers to enter the market and 
provide drugs at a more affordable price. However, brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies are averse to parting with profits easily, which has 
spawned the trend of product hopping. 
In recent years, several brand-name pharmaceutical companies have 
attempted, with mixed results, to engage in product hopping to preclude 
generics from entering the market. Although the intersection of intellectual 
property law, antitrust law, and millions of dollars in profit draw significant 
attention to product hopping, the balance between quality, continued 
innovation, and access by consumers remains at the center of the issue. 
Following a split among federal district courts in deciding these cases, the 
Second Circuit’s decision in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC 
and the court’s bright-line rule certainly provides guidance to the 
pharmaceutical industry going forward on this issue.1 While the decision is a 
victory for consumers and antitrust advocates alike, the Second Circuit broke 
new ground by reaching into a previously untouched area. This decision has 
potential to harm brand-name pharmaceutical companies if this remedy is 
abused. The remedy requiring a pharmaceutical company to continue 
manufacturing a discontinued drug reaches too far and sets a dangerous 
precedent. 
Section II of this comment provides the necessary history and background 
for understanding product hopping. It also presents the issues involved with 
product hopping, and examines arguments from both sides as to why or why 
not this action should be regulated by antitrust law. Section III analyzes the 
holdings and implications of the federal district court cases involving product 
hopping, as well as the recent Second Circuit decision on this issue. This 
comment concludes with Section IV, which discusses the fallout from the 
string of product-hopping cases, as well as the potential for intervention from 
the Supreme Court to make an ultimate ruling on this issue. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Although this comment will generally examine pharmaceutical product 
hopping through the lens of antitrust law, it is important to note that this issue 
 
 1. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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implicates other legal areas. For instance, often times patent and intellectual 
property law act as a catalyst for product-hopping cases. Moreover, other laws 
regulating the pharmaceutical market also play a substantial role. This section 
begins with an explanation of product hopping and then introduces some of the 
laws and regulations that come into play. These laws and regulations facilitate 
a better understanding as to why pharmaceutical companies employ the tactic 
of product hopping. 
A. Product Hopping Explained 
Simply put, product hopping occurs when a brand-name pharmaceutical 
company takes an existing drug, modifies the formula of that drug, and then 
attempts to shift consumers from the old version of the drug to the new 
version.2 In an era of constant software version 2.0 updates, this may seem like 
pharmaceutical companies are simply putting out a 2.0 version of their product. 
However, in an Amicus Brief, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) explains 
the anticompetitive motives of many product hoppers, asserting that product 
hopping can interfere with the regulations that govern the sale of brand-name 
and generic drugs and can also inhibit price competition in the pharmaceutical 
market.3 The FTC further explains, “A brand company can interfere with the 
mechanism by which generic drugs compete by making modest non-
therapeutic changes to its product, and effectively prevent generic 
competition.”4 An examination of policy considerations, the interaction 
between generic drugs and antitrust law, and the unique pharmaceutical market 
illuminates the motives behind product hopping. 
While product hopping certainly carries large ramifications for 
pharmaceutical profits, it also implicates several policy concerns for the 
pharmaceutical industry. Turning first to brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies, the central argument is that antitrust scrutiny of product hopping 
prevents brand pharmaceutical companies from innovating.5 In its Amicus 
Brief supporting Actavis in the recent Second Circuit case, the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) asserts, “The preliminary 
injunction [against Actavis] dampens the very competition and innovation the 
 
 2. Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (2008). 
 3. Federal Trade Commission’s Brief as Amicus Curiae at 1, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner 
Chilcott Public Ltd. Co., Civ. No. 12-3824 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2012). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Brief of the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 25, 
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2nd Cir. 2015) (No. 15-2236) 
[hereinafter American Antitrust Institute Brief]. 
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antitrust laws are intended to foster.”6 In the same case, Brattle Economists 
echoed the concerns of PhRMA explaining, “[T]he [i]njunction [against 
Actavis] is unwarranted, unnecessary, and harms both competition and 
innovation.”7 With doctors and patients relying more and more on 
pharmaceuticals for treatment,8 the concern that government regulation could 
impede innovation in the pharmaceutical industry cannot be taken lightly. As 
such, this general argument is ubiquitous throughout product-hopping litigation 
cases.9 
Conversely, generics and antitrust enforcers rely on different policy 
concerns with product-hopping cases. The first involves the unique nature of 
the pharmaceutical market. In a typical market, consumers select products and 
pay for them, which enables them to weigh the options and determine if the 
higher cost of a product is worth the benefit.10 However, unlike other 
consumer markets, with prescription pharmaceuticals, consumers do not have 
the option to strike a balance between quality and price because of the nature 
of the market.11 First, Pharmaceutical Benefit Managers (PBMs) are 
responsible for administering prescriptions for a health plan.12 PBMs negotiate 
drug prices with pharmacies and develop a formulary, or “medication tiers.”13 
These “medication tiers” list the prescriptions that are covered under a 
particular plan.14 The tier that the drug is listed under determines the co-pays 
for the covered drugs.15 As a result, PBMs ultimately dictate what drugs are 
covered under a plan and the co-pay that consumers will pay for them. 
Adding to the complexity of the pharmaceutical market is the fact that 
doctors choose the drugs that patients have to purchase, creating a “price 
disconnect.”16 The “price disconnect” refers to the situation where a physician 
chooses the drugs that the consumer needs, but the consumer or the consumer’s 
 
 6. Brief for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Appellants at 12, New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-4624) [hereinafter PhRMA Brief]. 
 7. Brief of Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 3, 
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-4624) 
[hereinafter Antitrust Economists Brief]. 
 8. Elizabeth D. Kantor et al., Trends in Prescription Drug Use Among Adults in the United 
States from 1999-2012, 313 JAMA 1818, 1829 (2015). 
 9. See generally Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 16, 2015); New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 10. American Antitrust Institute, supra note 5, at 6. 
 11. Id. at 6–7. 
 12. Understanding What is a PBM, PRXN (Oct. 2009), https://www.prxn.com/docs/PRxN% 
20Understanding%20PBMs.pdf. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. American Antitrust Institute, supra note 5, at 6. 
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insurance company pays for the drugs.17 Thus, a problem is created because 
doctors prescribing drugs are not as likely to take price into account since they 
are not paying for it.18 Moreover, because of the “price disconnect,” physicians 
have less incentive to switch patients over to generic drugs after the market 
exclusivity period for a brand-name manufacturer ends.19 Therefore, advocates 
of antitrust scrutiny contend that antitrust laws are necessary to switch power 
from physicians to consumers and remedy this “price disconnect” created by 
the pharmaceutical market.20 
In addition to concerns with the inability of the pharmaceutical market to 
regulate itself, proponents of antitrust scrutiny also focus on the consumer 
access and quality arguments. In its brief supporting the patent challenger, the 
American Antitrust Institute (AAI) contends, “A product reformulation 
prevents the generic product from being substitutable at the pharmacy counter 
for the redesigned brand product, and thus impairs the generic’s most cost-
efficient (and only commercially feasible) means of competing.”21 The AAI 
further asserts that by maintaining monopolies, brand manufacturers reduce 
consumers’ access to more affordable generics.22 Essentially, the brand-name 
pharmaceutical developers attempt to keep the generics off the market, which 
forces consumers to pay the brand drug’s price, thereby reducing access. In 
order to fully understand how product hopping works, some background 
knowledge of the drug development process is necessary. This is because the 
proprietary drug development system, which is designed to protect and nurture 
innovation, is the very system that makes product hopping possible. 
B. Proprietary Drug Development and the “Patent Cliff” 
Brand-name pharmaceutical companies invest huge sums of time and 
money in developing new prescription drugs.23 In fact, PhRMA reports that it 
takes a minimum of ten years for a new drug to go from initial discovery to the 
marketplace.24 Moreover, a November 2014 cost study conducted by Tufts 
Center for the Study of Drug Development (CSDD), which surveyed all 
investigational compounds from the top fifty pharmaceutical companies in a 
twelve-year window, estimated that it costs approximately $2.6 billion for a 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 7. 
 19. Cheng, supra note 2, at 1509. 
 20. Antitrust Economists Brief, supra note 7. 
 21. Id. at 4. 
 22. Id. 
 23. TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., COST OF DEVELOPING A NEW DRUG 
(2014), http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/Tufts_CSDD_briefing_on_RD_cost_study_-_Nov_18, 
_2014.pdf [hereinafter TUFTS]. 
 24. PhRMA, BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, THE PROCESS BEHIND 
NEW MEDICINES 1 (2015) [hereinafter PhRMA]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
218 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 10:213 
brand-name pharmaceutical company to develop a new drug and win 
approval.25 Also noteworthy, out of the 1,442 compounds that the CSDD 
studied, only 7.1% of the drugs were approved, with 80.3% being discontinued 
at some point during the development process, and 12.6% still active in some 
phase of the development process.26 PhRMA corroborates this low approval 
rate by explaining that out of all of the drugs that make it to clinical testing, 
less than 12% will ever be approved.27 Once a pharmaceutical drug makes it 
through drug discovery, preclinical lab testing, and three phases of clinical 
trials,28 the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requires that a manufacturer 
must submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).29 
In order to ensure that brand-name pharmaceutical companies continue to 
innovate and create new drugs, the FDA offers an incentivizing carrot at the 
end of this ten year, $2.6 billion stick: exclusive rights to market and sell the 
newly developed drug.30 Once the NDA is approved, pharmaceutical 
companies enjoy a market exclusivity period, giving them a statutory right to 
market and sell the drug to the exclusion of all competitors.31 FDA market 
exclusivity is granted when the FDA approves a new drug, and it precludes 
approval of generic drugs for five to seven years.32 On the other hand, patents 
expire twenty years from the date of filing.33 Therefore, if the brand-name 
manufacturer applies for a patent at the beginning of the ten-year development 
period, it holds the patent rights for the first ten years the drug is on the market 
and has FDA market exclusivity for five to seven of those years. This grants 
pharmaceutical companies some discretion to set prices, the idea being that the 
exclusivity period enables the companies to recoup losses and generate profits 
to reinvest into future research and development.34 The exclusivity period 
grants brand-name pharmaceutical companies some leeway to set prices, but 
the caveat is that brand-name companies are on borrowed time until they face 
the inevitable end of this freedom: the “patent cliff.”35 
 
 25. TUFTS, supra note 23, at 5. 
 26. Id. at 16. 
 27. PhRMA Brief, supra note 6, at 6. 
 28. PHRMA, supra note 24, at 2, 8, 10. 
 29. Cheng, supra note 2, at 1475. 
 30. Id. at 1474. 
 31. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm (last updated July 18, 
2014); Cheng, supra note 2, at 1475–76. 
 32. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 31. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Antitrust Economists Brief, supra note 7, at 23. 
 35. See generally VanEck, Why the Patent Cliff is a Key Driver of Generic Drug Growth, 
MKT. REALIST (Mar. 3, 2016, 1:58 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2016/03/patent-cliff-driver-ge 
neric-drugs-growth/. 
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After the exclusivity period expires, the brand-name manufacturer runs 
into the “patent cliff,” which is the term used to describe the extreme downturn 
in product sales that a pharmaceutical company experiences when its market 
exclusivity period expires and competitors can enter the market.36 Although 
brand-name manufacturers may face competition from anyone, “[t]he most 
potent threat to profits comes from generic manufacturers, who can produce 
equivalents of off-patent brand-name drugs without incurring the high research 
and development costs of drug discovery.”37 
Unsurprisingly, the entry of generics into the market has a substantial 
effect on a drug’s price. Typically, the two most substantial price reductions 
occur after the second entry of a generic, and then again after entry of a third 
generic.38 In fact, the FTC finds that prices drop between 13.7% and 22.6% 
after entry of the second generic.39 After entry of a third generic, the price 
drops between 31.5% and 54.3%.40 To illustrate what these percentages mean 
in terms of money, take Pfizer’s Protonix, used to treat gastroesophageal reflux 
disease and other acid hypersecretory diseases.41 In 2007, Protonix made over 
$1.9 billion.42 However, in 2010, when Pfizer’s market exclusivity period 
expired and generics entered the market, Protonix fell to $480 million.43 
Undoubtedly, the effects the “patent cliff” has on the revenues of brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies brings to light the incentive for brand-name 
manufactures to hold onto the exclusivity period for as long as possible. 
C. Vehicles for Encouraging Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act and The 
Sherman Act 
While the loss of revenue after generic entry is concerning for brand-name 
manufacturers, the fact of the matter is that consumers rely on generic 
competition to make the drugs they need to survive more affordable.44 
Recognizing the need for generics to lower prices and improve access for 
 
 36. Nathan Jessop, Responding to the Patent Cliff, PHARMTECH.COM (July 1, 2013), 
http://www.pharmtech.com/responding-patent-cliff. 
 37. Cheng, supra note 2, at 1476. 
 38. See Luke M. Olson & Brett W. Wendling, The Effect of Generic Drug Competition on 
Generic Drug Prices During the Hatch-Waxman 180-Day Exclusivity Period 20 (Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Working Paper No. 317, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/re 
ports/estimating-effect-entry-generic-drug-prices-using-hatch-waxman-exclusivity/wp317.pdf. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Jack DeRuiter & Pamela L. Holston, Drug Patent Expirations and the “Patent Cliff,” 
U.S. PHARM., June 2012, at 16. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See What are Generic Drugs?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/ucm14 
4456.htm (last updated June 19, 2015). 
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consumers, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, now known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.45 The Hatch-
Waxman Act has two main goals: 
First . . . to ensure that brand-name . . . drug manufacturers would have 
meaningful patent protection and a period of marketing exclusivity to enable 
them to recoup their investments in the development of valuable new drugs. 
Second . . . to ensure that, once the statutory patent protection and marketing 
exclusivity for these new drugs has expired, consumers would benefit from the 
rapid availability of lower priced generic versions.46 
As discussed previously, brand-name manufacturers are required to file an 
NDA, and if approved, they receive the exclusivity period under the Hatch-
Waxman Act. However, the Act allows generic drug companies to seek 
expedited approvals to manufacture the brand-name drugs that passed the 
expiration point of the exclusivity period.47 When a generic drug manufacturer 
wants to enter the market, they must file an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) with the FDA.48 In addition to the expedited approval 
process, the Hatch-Waxman Act grants 180-day exclusivity rights to the first 
generic manufacturer to file an ANDA, allowing them to market the generic to 
the exclusion of other generics during this time period.49 Finally, the Hatch-
Waxman Act provides avenues for generic drug manufacturers to challenge a 
brand-name manufacturer’s patent exclusivity on a drug.50 
The Hatch-Waxman Act has been an effective means for bringing generics 
into the market and improving access to drugs for consumers. In fact, “[s]ince 
1984, over 10,000 generic drugs have entered the market, and generics now 
account for close to [fifty] percent of prescriptions filled.”51 The Hatch-
Waxman Act and the ANDA are the competition that brand-name 
manufacturers are trying to avoid with product hopping. While the Hatch-
Waxman Act controls the small piece of the puzzle that is generic entry, 
product hopping also implicates the broader authority of the Sherman Act. 
In fact, no examination of product hopping would be complete without a 
brief overview of the Sherman Act. In the context of product hopping, “[t]he 
 
 45. Lisa Barons Pensabene & Dennis Gregory, Hatch-Waxman Act: Overview, PRAC. L. 
COMPANY 1, http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/Hatch-Waxman%20 
Act%20Overview%20lpensabene_dgregory.pdf (last visited July 24, 2016). 
 46. Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement before the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary: Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 
(Hatch-Waxman Amendments) (Aug. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Troy Statement]. 
 47. M. Sean Royall et al., Antitrust Scrutiny of Pharmaceutical “Product Hopping,” 28 
ANTITRUST 71, 71 (2013). 
 48. Cheng, supra note 2, at 1477. 
 49. Id. at 1479. 
 50. Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 45, at 3. 
 51. Troy Statement, supra note 46. 
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Sherman Act[] prevent[s] patent holding manufacturers from exploiting their 
patent-conferred monopoly to improperly harm competitors and threaten 
consumer welfare.”52 Generally speaking, the Sherman Act has two major 
components. Section 1 reads: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to 
be illegal.”53 Section 2, which aims to prevent monopolies, reads in pertinent 
part: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part 
of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”54 As the 
examination of product-hopping litigation reveals, the cases primarily involve 
Section 2 challenges. 
Although the Sherman Act has a broad scope, in the context of product 
hopping, it is critical to note that its central focus is to promote vigorous 
market competition.55 There are many issues at play in product-hopping 
litigation, but the Sherman Act forms the backdrop for much of the analysis. 
Since the focus of the Sherman Act is to eliminate monopolies while fostering 
vigorous competition, litigants in product-hopping cases are grappling to draw 
the line between aggressive marketing and monopolization. 
D. Soft Switch Versus Hard Switch 
As is evident, a delicate balance exists between allowing generic entry into 
the pharmaceutical market while encouraging brand-name manufacturers to 
innovate. Ensuring that consumers can get prescriptions at an affordable cost is 
paramount. However, consumers also need brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies to continue developing new treatments for previously untreatable 
ailments, and to keep improving current formulas to make them safer and more 
effective. An examination of the concepts of soft switching and hard switching 
is necessary to understand the balancing act courts wrestle with in product-
hopping cases. 
A soft switch occurs when a brand-name pharmaceutical company 
attempting to product hop keeps the original drug on the market and then tries 
to persuade doctors and patients to switch over to its new version of the drug.56 
Alternatively, a hard switch, also known as a “forced switch,” occurs when a 
pharmaceutical company discontinues the original drug with the expiring 
exclusivity period and only markets the newly formulated drug.57 As the 
 
 52. Cheng, supra note 2, at 1475. 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 54. Id. § 2. 
 55. Cheng, supra note 2, at 1500. 
 56. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SECOND CIRCUIT FINDS “PRODUCT HOPPING” BY A 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY TO VIOLATE ANTITRUST LAWS 3 (May 29, 2015). 
 57. Id. at 2. 
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federal district and circuit cases illustrate, the concept of soft switching versus 
hard switching is central to product-hopping litigation and appears to have 
serious implications for brand-name manufacturers going forward. 
Additionally, the recent Actavis case implies that the existence of hard 
switching is now a dispositive factor in the analysis.58 
III.  LITIGATION AND THE FEDERAL DISTRICT SPLIT 
As evidenced by the previous section, the recently developed strategy of 
product hopping entails a host of issues, arguments, and serious policy 
implications. Not surprisingly, courts facing the issue have come down 
differently on these cases depending on the facts and circumstances 
surrounding each case. This section examines each of the major federal district 
court product-hopping decisions and analyzes the court’s reasoning and 
varying facts of each case that has led to the federal district split. This split has 
caused one case to rise to the circuit level with a second pending—the outcome 
of which could result in a grant of certiorari from the United States (U.S.) 
Supreme Court. 
A. Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals (2006) 
In May of 2006, the Federal District Court of Delaware decided what 
appeared to be the first case of an antitrust claim brought against a brand-name 
pharmaceutical company for product hopping.59 In this case, the drug at issue 
was TriCor, which treated high triglycerides and had indications of treating 
high cholesterol.60 Plaintiff (Teva) generic manufacturers brought an action 
alleging that the brand-name manufacturer, defendant (Abbott), averted 
generic entry by changing the formulation of TriCor.61 Here, Abbott changed 
the formulation of TriCor twice.62 The first time, Abbott changed TriCor from 
its original capsule to 54 milligram (mg) and 160 mg tablets.63 Then, Abbott 
changed TriCor to a new form of the tablet that came in doses of 48 mg and 
145 mg.64 During the second switch, Abbott changed the label of the drug to 
reflect that the new tablet no longer needed to be taken with food.65 
 
 58. See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 654 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 59. Royall et al., supra note 47, at 73. 
 60. Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 415 (D. Del. 2006). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 416. A tablet is a small mass of medicated material. Tablet, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2015). Conversely, a capsule is a small container that is 
filled with medicine. Capsule, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2015). 
 64. Abbott, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 418. 
 65. Id. 
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Notably, after the first switch, Abbott stopped selling the capsules, bought 
back existing supplies from pharmacies, and changed the code in the National 
Drug Data File (NDDF) to “obsolete,”66 which prevented pharmacies from 
filling prescriptions for TriCor with the generic capsule.67 Moreover, when 
Abbott changed to the newer form of the tablets during the second switch, 
Abbott stopped selling the old version of the tablets and changed the NDDF 
code to “obsolete” again.68 In response to this suit, Abbott filed a motion to 
dismiss and argued that the new formulations were improvements on the drug, 
which made the change lawful under antitrust law.69 Additionally, Abbott 
contended that even though the changed forms were disruptive to the generics, 
they were under no duty to aid competitors.70 
The court rejected Abbott’s arguments and denied its motion to dismiss.71 
In its decision, the court distinguished this case from the Second Circuit 
antitrust case of Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.72 In Kodak, the 
plaintiff alleged that Kodak had monopoly power, and its introduction of a new 
film further limited consumer choice.73 Finding that Kodak did not violate 
antitrust law by introducing a new type of film, the Second Circuit relied upon 
the fact that Kodak did not quit producing its old version of the film, which 
gave consumers the free choice to switch without coercing them.74 Notably, 
the Second Circuit in the Kodak decision suggested that it might have decided 
differently if Kodak had removed the old film.75 By contrast, the district court 
in Teva found that when Abbott quit selling the old versions and changed the 
NDDF code, it resulted in “consumer coercion” and was thereby “potentially 
anticompetitive.”76 Interestingly, although the term was not yet in use at the 
time of this case, the court essentially found that by removing the previous 
versions of the drug, Abbott engaged in a hard switch. Teva set up the basis for 
antitrust cases filed against product-hopping brand-name companies, and as 
later cases illustrate, the coercion present in this case became a key factor for 
 
 66. Id. at 416. 
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which prevented pharmacies from filling TriCor prescriptions with a generic capsule 
formulation.” Id. 
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 73. Abbott, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (citing Berkey, 603 F.2d at 287). 
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determining whether or not the brand-name company’s action constituted a 
hard switch. 
B. Walgreen v. AstraZeneca (2008) 
Two years after the Teva decision, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia was confronted with another pharmaceutical product-hopping 
case. However, in this case, the court reached the opposite decision of that in 
Teva. 
This case centered on the heartburn drug Prilosec.77 Here, plaintiff 
Walgreen filed suit alleging that defendant, AstraZeneca, switched consumers 
from Prilosec over to its newly FDA-approved equivalent drug Nexium, just as 
the patent exclusivity period was about to expire on Prilosec.78 The plaintiff 
contended that Prilosec and Nexium were virtually identical drugs and that a 
dose of Nexium would have the same effect as a dose of Prilosec.79 
AstraZeneca received FDA approval to begin making Nexium eight months 
before Prilosec’s patent expired and began facing generic competition.80 As 
soon as Nexium entered the market, AstraZeneca “very aggressively 
promoted” and “detailed”81 Nexium to doctors, while it simultaneously 
stopped promoting and detailing Prilosec to doctors.82 
In this case, the court granted defendant AstraZeneca’s motion to 
dismiss.83 The District Court for the District of Columbia distinguished the 
Teva decision, finding that the “critical factor” was the presence of consumer 
choice that was lacking in Teva.84 The court explained that in Teva, the 
defendant eliminated choice for consumers by removing the old version of its 
product and changing the NDDF code.85 AstraZeneca did not eliminate a 
choice, but rather added a new choice for consumers by introducing a new 
drug to compete with its already established drug, Prilosec.86 In response to 
plaintiff’s allegations that Nexium was no different than Prilosec, the court 
explained that antitrust law does not require a new product to be superior 
because the marketplace allows consumers to make that determination.87 
 
 77. Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 148 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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Although the cases of Teva and Walgreen reached opposite conclusions, 
they can be reconciled with little difficulty, as they illustrate the opposite ends 
of the spectrum. Just as Teva gave the first example of an illegal hard switch, 
Walgreen provides an example of a legal soft switch. On one end, Abbott 
eliminated choice by removing the old version of TriCor from the market, and 
thereby coerced consumers.88 Conversely, Walgreen constituted a legal soft 
switch because AstraZeneca did not remove its old drug Prilosec or eliminate 
consumer choice, but rather added a new choice and thereby did not coerce 
consumers.89 Understanding this spectrum created by case law is critical as it 
provides a guide of what is permissible and what is not for pharmaceutical 
companies looking to avoid product-hopping liability. While these cases 
demonstrate both ends of the spectrum, the subsequent cases are less cut and 
dry. 
C. Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Warner Chilcott (2015) 
More recently, a third case has come down that falls somewhere in 
between the Teva and Walgreen cases. In 2015, Mylan v. Warner Chilcott90 
added an interesting wrinkle to the growing body of case law on 
pharmaceutical product hopping. In that case, the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania faced a claim involving Warner Chilcott’s acne drug 
Doryx, and granted summary judgment for the defendants, who included 
brand-name pharmaceutical company Warner Chilcott.91 
First, the development and subsequent marketing of Doryx form an 
interesting backdrop to the case. The drug Doryx has been around since 1985 
and was originally developed by Mayne Pharmaceuticals (Mayne).92 However, 
sales were slow, so in 1994, Mayne entered into an agreement with Warner 
Chilcott to increase sales of the drug.93 The agreement stated that Mayne 
would be the sole manufacturer and supplier of Doryx to Warner Chilcott and 
that Warner Chilcott would market and distribute the drug in the United States 
in return for the income from domestic sales of the drug.94 The agreement is 
still in place today and has been renewed several times, as this agreement has 
increased sales of Doryx over twenty-fold since its inception.95 Finally, it is 
noteworthy that plaintiff “Mylan Pharmaceuticals is the third-largest generic 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 
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pharmaceutical company in the world” with annual revenue of $6.13 billion, 
while Mayne had a 2011 revenue of $50.1 million, and Warner Chilcott 
reported a revenue of $2.7 billion that same year.96 
Turning to the claims, plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants made 
several, non-beneficial changes to Doryx over a six-year period, all of which 
constituted anticompetitive product hopping.97 The product switches at issue 
were: (1) Doryx was changed from 75 mg and 100 mg capsules to 75 mg and 
100 mg tablets, (2) defendant introduced a single-scored98 150 mg tablet, (3) 
defendant added a single score to the 75 mg and 100 mg tablets, and (4) 
defendant added a dual score to the 150 mg tablets.99 Additionally, Mylan 
asserted that Warner Chilcott stopped selling and promoting prior versions of 
Doryx, and eventually it completely removed them from the pharmaceuticals 
market.100 Notably, Mylan’s suit did not allege that defendants ever changed 
the NDDF codes to preclude generic substitution, as happened in Teva.101 
In granting Warner Chilcott’s motion for summary judgment, the court 
found that it did not have monopoly power and that its conduct was not 
anticompetitive.102 Turning first to the Sherman Act Section 2 claim, the court 
found that defendants only had control over eighteen percent of the acne 
medication market, which was not a predominant share.103 Additionally, the 
court took into account that Mylan and Warner Chilcott were competing in the 
acne oral drug market, and that Mylan was “more than twice the size of 
Warner Chilcott, and 100 times the size of Mayne.”104 Turning to the 
anticompetitive claim against defendants, the court found that Mylan was able 
to compete with Warner Chilcott and that the changes to Doryx made by 
Warner Chilcott did not exclude Mylan from competing.105 Additionally, the 
court took into account the fact that Mylan had spent no money to promote or 
market its generics.106 The court acknowledged that as a result of the changes 
to Doryx, Mylan’s generics would not be automatically substituted unless 
Mylan redesigned its generics to match the current version of Doryx.107 
However, the court agreed with defendant’s contention that this was a problem 
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with Mylan’s business model but did not rise to the level of an antitrust 
injury.108 
As stated above, although Teva and Walgreen were easily reconciled as 
defining the outer edges of the spectrum of hard versus soft switching, the 
court’s reasoning in Mylan makes it difficult to place on the spectrum. Mylan 
did not rely on Teva or Walgreen, but it seems that Mylan lies somewhere in 
the middle. The facts lack the essential element of coercion present in Teva. 
However, elements of hard switching are present, as Warner Chilcott 
eventually removed old forms of the drug, as did the defendant in Teva. 
However, the fact that Warner Chilcott never changed the NDDF codes is at 
least part of the reason why it did not rise to the level of coercion present in 
Teva.109 
Mylan presents another example of aggressive marketing, but just as in 
Walgreen, courts do not appear to view that alone as rising to the level of 
coercion. Mylan’s place in the small, but growing case law on this subject is 
made more complex since Mylan is appealing the district court’s rejection of 
its product-hopping claim to the Third Circuit.110 Time will tell whether the 
Third Circuit will affirm the decision, which would create a split between the 
Second and Third Circuit, or follow the Second Circuit’s decision in Actavis 
and reverse the district court. 
D. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis (2015) 
The final pharmaceutical product-hopping case to examine is the most 
recent case in this line of litigation and also currently the only circuit level 
decision on this issue. In this case, the Second Circuit upheld a preliminary 
injunction against the defendant: brand-name pharmaceutical company 
Actavis.111 
Unlike the previous cases on this issue where the generic drug company 
brought suit, here, New York’s Attorney General brought the claim against the 
brand-name pharmaceutical company Actavis and its subsidiary Forest 
Laboratories.112 This case is centered on Actavis’s drug Namenda IR (IR), 
which treats moderate to severe Alzheimer’s disease.113 The New York 
Attorney General brought an antitrust suit alleging that as the patent protection 
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period on twice-daily IR was ending, Actavis introduced a new once-daily 
version of the drug, known as Namenda XR (XR).114 The Attorney General 
claimed that by doing this, Actavis precluded generic competition for the drug 
IR, and it prohibited generics for XR from entering the market until 2029 
because the switch to XR would ensure patent exclusivity until that time.115 
In upholding the district court’s decision to grant an injunction barring 
defendants from removing IR from the market, the court scrutinized the facts 
surrounding these drugs and the defendant’s actions.116 First, the Second 
Circuit made note of the fact that IR and XR are currently the only memantine 
therapy drugs on the market for individuals suffering from moderate to severe 
Alzheimer’s disease.117 IR generated over $1.5 billion in annual sales in 2012 
and 2013.118 The court also noted that the only medical difference between IR 
and XR is that IR is taken twice a day and released immediately, while XR 
releases gradually and is only taken once a day.119 Other than that, the drugs 
have the same active ingredients and effects, although the court acknowledged 
that all other Alzheimer’s drugs were taken only once a day, like XR.120 
Although IR and XR are currently the only two drugs in this particular 
market, five generics had FDA approval to enter as soon as the IR patent 
expired.121 However, the generics were planning to compete with IR, not 
XR.122 Since XR has a different dosage structure, the generics are not 
equivalent to the new version of XR, and as a result, pharmacists cannot 
substitute a generic IR for XR under state substitution laws.123 State 
substitution laws “permit or require pharmacists to dispense a therapeutically 
equivalent, lower-cost generic drug in place of a brand drug.”124 
Turning to the alleged product hop, the facts indicate that initially, Actavis 
attempted to convert patients from IR over to the new XR version.125 At the 
beginning, Actavis sold both versions, but merely stopped marketing IR and 
instead spent money to promote XR.126 However, Actavis determined that only 
thirty percent of IR patients would voluntarily switch to XR before the 
generics entered, so it requested that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
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Services remove IR from its list, and it subsequently announced that IR would 
be discontinued.127 
In choosing to uphold the injunction against Actavis, the Second Circuit 
ruled on several of the issues that have presented themselves in the district 
court cases addressing product hopping. An examination of this ruling can 
provide potential guidance for brand-name pharmaceutical companies looking 
to avoid these types of suits.128 First, and perhaps most notably, the Second 
Circuit drew a bright-line distinction between soft switching and hard 
switching.129 The Second Circuit affirmed the lines drawn in Teva and 
Walgreen by stating that had Actavis left IR on the market and persuasively 
marketed XR, which amounts to a soft switch, there would not have been 
antitrust liability.130 However, because Actavis made a hard switch by 
introducing XR and effectively withdrawing IR, the court found that 
“[d]efendants’ hard switch crosses the line from persuasion to coercion and is 
anticompetitive.”131 
Actavis asserted that it did leave IR on the market by entering into an 
agreement with a mail-order pharmacy that allowed patients to get IR if it was 
“medically necessary,” but the court determined less than three percent of IR 
users would be able to access it, and this was not sufficient to avoid antitrust 
liability.132 Second, the decision indicates that timing of withdrawal can be 
critical.133 The court found a violation of antitrust law in part because Actavis 
removed IR before generic entry, and it explained that had Actavis waited until 
after the generics were established on the market, there would not have been an 
antitrust violation.134 Finally, the Second Circuit relied heavily on the intent of 
Actavis in its decision.135 The court relied on numerous Actavis documents 
that stated the intent of Actavis was to move patients from IR to XR as fast as 
possible to avoid generic competition.136 Therefore, the Second Circuit found 
that Actavis’s conduct reached the level of coercion and took the opportunity 
to lay down a bright-line rule for product hoppers going forward.137 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Shearman & Sterling Memorandum, supra note 111, at 5. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 5–6. 
 131. Actavis, 787 F.3d at 654. 
 132. Shearman & Sterling Memorandum, supra note 111, at 6. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Final notes on Actavis: In March of 2015, Actavis acquired Allergan for $70.5 billion, 
and adopted Allergan as its new global name. ALLERGAN, Actavis Completes Allergan 
Acquisition, ALLERGAN.COM (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reu 
ters/actavis-completes-allergan-acquisition. Actavis, now Allergan, petitioned the U.S. Supreme 
Court for Writ of Certiorari to weigh in on pharmaceutical product hopping. Ed Silverman, 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
230 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 10:213 
IV.  EXAMINING THE ISSUE: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
Although the recent Second Circuit decision in Actavis provides some 
guidance to brand-name pharmaceutical companies considering a product hop, 
the issue is far from settled. With the Mylan case on appeal to the Third 
Circuit, the case law around product hopping promises to continue growing. 
Many gray areas remain ripe for litigation, but an examination of the 
implications of these cases makes one thing clear: antitrust regulation of 
product hopping is essential. 
A. Necessary Antitrust Regulation 
Without question, the pharmaceutical market has a regulatory scheme and 
structure that is unlike any other, making it a difficult and expensive place to 
do business. But much to the chagrin of brand-name pharmaceutical companies 
competing with generics in this market, society cannot afford to allow them 
carte blanche in their marketing strategies. The ultimate goal of the Sherman 
Act is to foster competition.138 When a brand-name drug enters the market, it 
faces weak, and in some cases, virtually non-existent competition from other 
drugs.139 Therefore, generics provide a source of competition by offering a 
product that is extremely close to the brand-name drug but at only a fraction of 
the price.140 Without generic competition, brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies would have the power to control market prices—the exact 
definition of a monopoly.141 As such, in order to keep competition alive in the 
pharmaceutical market, antitrust regulation is not only warranted, but it is also 
a necessity. 
While fostering competition on its face is a sufficient enough reason to 
warrant antitrust regulation, the underlying reason of access further bolsters the 
argument. In the absence of competition, brand-name companies would control 
the price of pharmaceutical drugs. In a country where people depend on drugs 
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for everything from pain management to treating chronic illnesses,142 this 
reality could be truly disastrous. Without affordably priced prescriptions, the 
seventy percent of U.S. citizens that take prescription drugs on a daily basis143 
could face extreme financial hardship. To illustrate, take the Actavis IR case. 
Based on data provided to the court by Actavis, consumers would have to “pay 
almost $300 million more, and third-party payers would pay almost $1.4 
billion more,” if Actavis were permitted to remove IR prior to generic entry.144 
Additionally, the Department of Health and Human Services found that the 
withdrawal of IR before generic entry would cost Medicare a minimum of six 
billion dollars over ten years.145 While these numbers are large, they only 
represent one drug. If courts do not enforce antitrust violations against product-
hopping companies, product hopping could become more prevalent, and these 
numbers could increase by a large multiplier. With drug-related spending 
already accounting for twelve percent of total personal health care 
expenditures,146 it is questionable whether both the system and consumers 
could sustain these potentially huge increases in price. 
In response to these arguments, opponents assert that antitrust enforcement 
impedes innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.147 The idea of chilling 
innovation and deterring the development of new, potentially life-saving drugs 
is certainly concerning. However, this argument is less concerning than it 
sounds. When submitting its Amicus Brief in support of Plaintiff-Appellee 
State of New York in the Second Circuit Actavis case, the AAI addressed this 
argument. First, the AAI asserted that no empirical evidence existed showing 
that antitrust scrutiny of product hopping deters innovation.148 Moreover, the 
AAI further asserted that antitrust scrutiny of product hopping actually 
increases innovation.149 Without antitrust scrutiny of product hopping, brand-
name companies will invest in making minor alterations to products to extend 
the patent, rather than investing in research for new, innovative drugs.150 
Indeed, one study found that “[b]rand-name firms have sought increasing 
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recourse to ancillary patents on chemical variants, alternative formulations, 
methods of use, and relatively minor aspects of the drug.”151 Essentially, 
immunizing brand-name pharmaceutical companies from antitrust liability 
encourages them to spend time and resources in order to find ways to make 
insignificant changes to current drugs in order to preserve the patent, instead of 
using time and resources to develop the next innovative drug. 
In its Brief as Amicus Curiae filed with the district court in Mylan, the 
FTC bolstered this argument by asserting: “The threat posed to existing brand 
drugs by generic competition can incentivize the brand company facing 
dramatic loss of sales to develop new and innovative drugs that benefit 
consumers.”152 Notably, the FTC recently filed a Brief for Amicus Curiae in 
support of Mylan in its appeal to the Third Circuit.153 In sum, there is no 
evidence that antitrust regulation of product hopping slows down innovation 
by brand-name pharmaceutical companies. Rather, regulation actually 
encourages innovation, as the competition from generics causes brand-name 
manufactures to innovate new products and prevents them from spending 
resources on insignificant changes to extend patents. 
B. Limits on Antitrust Regulation 
Without question, antitrust scrutiny is appropriate, and necessary, in order 
to ensure that the pharmaceutical market continues to operate in a fair, 
affordable manner. Courts that take a lenient view with brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies leave consumers in the hands of monopoly powers 
and at risk of exorbitant prices. Thus, a strict view of product hopping seems 
warranted, and the Actavis Second Circuit decision supplies precedent to this 
end. While antitrust scrutiny is beneficial, it must be recognized that it can also 
be taken too far. Notwithstanding the fact that product hopping is an issue that 
courts must take a firm stance on, there is a legitimate question of what remedy 
is appropriate in these cases. Although the Second Circuit’s Actavis decision 
supplies a framework for pharmaceutical companies seeking to avoid these 
types of claims, the Second Circuit decision crosses a line that should remain 
untouched. 
After laying down the bright-line hard switching versus soft switching test 
and examining the timing and intent of Actavis, the court affirmed a powerful 
remedy. In its decision, the Second Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction 
that barred Actavis from “restricting access to Namenda IR prior to generic 
entry.”154 This injunction effectively requires Actavis to continue 
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manufacturing a drug that it discontinued.155 Although the facts clearly 
demonstrated that Actavis intended to preclude generic entry, “forcing 
production of a discontinued drug” is an “unprecedented” move.156 The court 
does not provide guidance on whether this type of injunction will be an 
acceptable remedy for all product-hopping cases or if this remedy is a result of 
the specific circumstances in this case.157 
In addition to requiring Actavis to continue producing a discontinued drug, 
the injunction does not allow Actavis to change the terms in which the product 
is sold.158 That is, Actavis must “maintain the status quo” of marketing and 
selling both IR and XR products to maintain consumer choice before and after 
generic entry.159 The court does not specify a minimum amount that Actavis 
must spend on marketing IR.160 But the court’s requirement that Actavis 
maintain the status quo may imply that Actavis needs to spend an amount 
consistent with their average marketing expenditures. Requiring that Actavis 
maintain the status quo also raises the question of how courts issuing these 
injunctions will ensure compliance with the injunction. Courts could 
potentially require enjoined defendants to submit financial records showing 
they are spending an appropriate amount on marketing both drugs equally. 
However, producing financial and expense records could be costly for parties. 
Additionally, reviewing these statements could be a very time consuming 
process for courts. 
Although the Second Circuit attempted to protect the market and 
consumers, requiring a company to continue making a discontinued product 
goes far beyond a traditional remedy. Actavis is the first product-hopping case 
where the government brought the action and was also the first case seeking an 
injunction.161 Here, the injunction requiring Actavis to continue selling a 
discontinued product reaches too far. While the goal of the Sherman Act is to 
“foster price competition,”162 the injunction takes this notion a step further by 
essentially requiring that one company incur great expense to ensure another 
company can compete with it. This notion runs afoul of the very intention of 
antitrust law. Explaining the purpose and policy of the Sherman Act, the U.S. 
Department of Justice asserts, “mere harm to competitors is not a basis for 
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antitrust liability.”163 Moreover, antitrust law is not meant to shield businesses 
from the way the market works.164 While antitrust law protects consumers by 
punishing unfair business practices, it is not designed to force a company to aid 
its competitors. Unfortunately, that is exactly what the injunction in Actavis 
accomplishes. 
Typically, courts have three options for remedy in antitrust cases: 
injunctive relief, monetary damages, and in some instances, criminal 
prosecution.165 Courts have latitude to grant injunctive relief that may have far 
reaching consequences in order to change a monopolist’s behavior.166 The 
Second Circuit has done so in the Actavis case, but the power of that injunction 
seems to stretch beyond the intended scope of injunctive remedy. In cases such 
as this, it seems more appropriate to seek monetary damages.167 Since the end 
goal of a product hopper is to preclude generic entry and thus profit from 
monopoly power, it follows that monetary damages would be an appropriate 
remedy. It could be argued that injunctive relief sends a stronger message; 
however, assessing a hefty fine of punitive and compensatory damages would 
likely get the attention of a brand-name pharmaceutical company just as well. 
Forcing a company to continue manufacturing a product moves out of the 
punitive realm and into a situation where a company is subsequently forced to 
aid a competitor—which is beyond the scope of antitrust law. Conversely, 
assessing monetary damages to blatant product hoppers achieves the goal of 
punishing wrongdoing without overreaching into uncharted waters and setting 
a potentially dangerous precedent. 
C. Future Litigation and Supreme Court Intervention 
Without question, pharmaceutical product hopping is far from resolution. 
With so much at stake, it is unlikely that brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies will cease efforts to avoid generic competition in the near future. 
Moreover, Mylan, one of the most prominent product-hopping cases, may just 
be getting started. Considering the extreme profits, coupled with the need for a 
balance between innovation in the pharmaceutical industry and access to drugs, 
it seems that Supreme Court intervention is looming. 
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court almost had the opportunity to 
decide whether or not to weigh in on product hopping, but it dismissed 
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Allergan’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari because the parties settled the case.168 
Although the Supreme Court never heard arguments, Allergan’s Petition for 
Certiorari outlines the potential questions that the Court will face should it 
decide to take up a product-hopping case. The Petition presented the Court 
with two salient issues: the first, “Whether exercising rights granted by the 
Patent Act—in particular, not selling one patented product and selling a 
different patented product instead—can violate the Sherman Antitrust Act?”169 
The second issue was: “Whether drug manufacturers have a federal antitrust 
duty to facilitate the operation of state drug substitution laws to maximize 
competitor’s sales?”170 Although it was dismissed, examining the Petition 
provides insight into possible arguments the Supreme Court could hear in the 
future. 
Unsurprisingly, the Petition begins by describing the unprecedented 
injunction that forced Allergan to continue producing and selling a drug they 
considered retired.171 The Second Circuit’s holding and injunction creates a 
duty that a brand drug manufacturer must produce and sell an outdated product 
to maximize the sales of generics.172 In making a case to the Supreme Court, 
Allergan expands on the common argument that antitrust regulation stifles 
innovation by asserting that the innovation process occurs through small, 
“incremental improvement[s]” and that brand-name companies must be 
allowed to make these small improvements in order to progress.173 While this 
explanation of the innovation process may certainly provide a basis for 
arguments by brand-name developers in future litigation, Allergan’s petition 
also foreshadows future issues that may result from product-hopping litigation. 
Allergan contends that the Second Circuit’s decision holding it liable for a 
violation of antitrust law “[p]recipitates a [c]ircuit [s]plit.”174 Allergan notes 
that the Seventh Circuit, Fourth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit have all 
recognized that “[p]reventing competitors from free-riding on a monopolist’s 
advertising or other investments is a legitimate business purpose that enhances 
rather than impedes competition.”175 Allergan contends that the Second Circuit 
found antitrust liability where other circuits have not.176 However, the 
powerful implications of product hopping paired with the unique nature of the 
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pharmaceutical market make it difficult to analogize a product-hopping case to 
a typical antitrust case. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not issue a ruling there, the wait may 
not be long for a second opportunity. The Mylan case presents a new 
opportunity for the Court to weigh in on pharmaceutical product hopping. The 
Mylan case seems to fall somewhere in between the hard switching done in 
Actavis and the legal soft switching in Walgreen. If the Third Circuit affirms 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and does not follow the Actavis decision, 
it will create a direct circuit split on the issue of antitrust liability for 
pharmaceutical product hopping. The Third Circuit’s ruling on whether or not 
there is antitrust liability in this case could begin to either solidify a stance 
against product-hopping or further muddle the issue. 
Interestingly, and perhaps as a result of the Actavis litigation, Mylan, the 
generic drug, has gained the support of the FTC as it prepares its appeal. In the 
Mylan District Court case, the FTC filed a brief as Amicus Curiae.177 
However, the FTC did not state in its brief whether or not it supported holding 
product-hopping companies liable for violating antitrust law.178 This amicus 
brief merely discussed competition in the pharmaceutical industry and noted 
the potential for brand-name manufacturers to exploit the market with product 
hopping.179 However, since Mylan appealed, the FTC made its stance clear by 
filing a Brief for Amicus Curiae supporting Mylan and explaining that 
companies who exploit monopoly power should face antitrust liability.180 The 
FTC contended that the district court erred in its judgment and misunderstood 
the unique characteristics of the pharmaceutical market.181 Additionally, the 
FTC relied on the Second Circuit Actavis decision to support its contention that 
Warner Chilcott had monopoly power and should face antitrust liability.182 The 
FTC maintained a neutral position when product-hopping litigation first began, 
but it now seems to favor holding product-hopping companies liable for 
antitrust violations. The shift in the FTC’s stance illustrates the magnitude of 
these cases, which further complicates the decision facing the Third Circuit. 
Adding to the need for Supreme Court intervention is the potential of a 
circuit split on the issue of antitrust liability for pharmaceutical product 
hopping. If a circuit split occurs, it could incentivize forum shopping, as 
companies will likely try to litigate in a more favorable forum. Perhaps more 
compelling is the increase in pharmaceutical startups, which magnifies the 
issue of forum shopping. For instance, “investments in biotechnology start-ups 
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rose 26 percent in the first half of 2014.”183 Continuing this trend, “[t]he first 
half of 2015 has already seen more than $6 [billion] invested, putting it on 
track to beat 2014’s total of $11.2 [billion] invested.”184 With this kind of 
funding, it is likely that the number of startup pharmaceutical companies will 
continue to rise. 
Additionally, many brand-name pharmaceutical companies rely on smaller 
startup pharmaceutical companies to innovate new products.185 The drug 
development process is expensive, but startup pharmaceutical companies have 
streamlined operating costs and lower overhead, allowing these startups to 
develop drugs more efficiently.186 If startup pharmaceutical companies want to 
preserve their patents, they may be incentivized to operate in a circuit with a 
lenient stance on product hopping. 
Depending on how the Third Circuit decides the Mylan appeal, a circuit 
split and its accompanying forum-shopping incentives may be the catalyst that 
prompts the Supreme Court to grant a writ and issue a decisive ruling on 
antitrust liability for pharmaceutical product hopping. Even if the Third Circuit 
follows Actavis, it remains to be seen whether it will follow the Second 
Circuit’s remedy, use a different option, or create a new one. Perhaps this issue 
of finding the appropriate remedy will attract the Court’s attention. Regardless, 
Supreme Court intervention in the issue of product hopping seems likely, if not 
imminent. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the end, many questions remain surrounding the use of antitrust law to 
prevent brand-name pharmaceutical companies from product hopping. 
Certainly, enforcing antitrust laws against product-hopping companies is 
essential to ensure that consumers can access the drugs they need. Permitting 
brand-name manufacturers to skirt liability severely inhibits the ability of 
generics to enter the market, thus upsetting the delicate balance of competition 
in the unique pharmaceutical market. This scenario paints a grim picture for 
the millions of Americans who depend on generic drugs to drive prices down 
to accessible and affordable amounts. 
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However, zealous antitrust advocates must remain aware of the fact that 
restricting brand-name pharmaceutical companies has a price, and pushing too 
far threatens to stifle innovation of new drugs and treatments. Even more 
perturbing is the potential for injunctive relief to impose potentially unfair and 
overreaching remedies in these types of cases, as happened in Actavis. 
Remembering that the goal of the Sherman Act is to foster competition,187 
courts hearing these cases must take care not to impose burdensome remedies 
that reach too far and stifle the exact thing antitrust laws are trying to foster—
innovation and competition. Although Actavis’s soft versus hard switching 
distinction gives brand-name pharmaceutical companies a bright-line rule to 
follow, much is left unknown for companies trying to avoid liability in these 
types of suits. 
It seems that the high stakes surrounding the pharmaceutical market, the 
potential circuit split, and the fear of unconscionable remedies may prompt the 
Supreme Court to intervene. Issuing a definitive ruling explaining where the 
line between permissible competitive strategies and impermissible 
exclusionary conduct lies would provide much needed guidance to an industry 
that survives by pushing the envelope of science and competition. Until such a 
ruling happens, brand-name pharmaceutical companies and generics are left to 
explore competitive advantages and battle over where the boundaries are 
drawn. While this promises to provide some interesting litigation, the 
uncertainty and potential consequences for the pharmaceutical industry that the 
nation is so dependent upon is an unsettling notion for us all. 
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